Sam Hirshman Contact Coffee CV Research


Published:

As Wages Increase, Do People Work More or Less? A Wage Frame Effect
(with Luxi Shen)
Management Science, November, 2022

Abstract: In jobs in which workers have the flexibility to decide how much work to supply, such as in the gig economy, the effect of a wage change on work supply can be hard to predict. A wage increase, for example, offers workers the opportunity to make more money, so they may want to work more, but at the same time, it allows them to enjoy more leisure, so they do not need to work so much. Economic theory alone does not predict which outcome is more likely to occur, and empirical evidence on the short-term effect of wage change on work supply is also mixed. This research provides some psychological insights into this economic problem by showing that the effect of wage change on work supply depends on how the change is framed. Specifically, for a worker who used to work A hours to earn $X, if the wage change is presented as a payment change (“work the same A hours and earn $Y”), then work supply is expected to change in the same direction as the wage change. By contrast, if the wage change is presented as a workload change (“work B hours and earn the same $X”), then work supply is expected to change in the opposite direction of the wage change. This wage frame effect occurs because in multi-attribute decisions, decision makers assign greater weight to attributes that change than to those that remain constant. A series of experiments (total N = 2,599) demonstrates the wage frame effect on both expressed willingness-to-work and actual work performance, and tests the proposed account as well as alternative explanations. Since any wage change has to be communicated with some specific frame, the choice of the frame can have powerful effects. In fact, it is even possible for a wage decrease to elicit the same increase in work supply as a wage increase. This research (a) offers psychological insights into a classic economic problem, (b) documents a novel framing effect for the judgment and decision-making literature, and (c) suggests a nudge idea in incentive designs to managers and policy makers.

Minimum Payments Alter Debt Repayment Strategies across Multiple Cards
(with Abigail B. Sussman)
Journal of Marketing, December, 2021

Abstract: US Households currently hold $770 billion in credit card debt, often managing repayments across multiple accounts. We investigate how minimum payments (i.e., the requirement to allocate at least some money to each account with a balance) alter consumers’ allocation strategies across multiple accounts. Across four experiments, we find that minimum payment requirements cause consumers to increase dispersion (i.e., spread their repayments more evenly) across accounts. We term this change in strategy the dispersion effect of minimum payments and provide evidence that it can be costly for consumers. We find that the effect is partially driven by the tendency for consumers to interpret minimum payment requirements as recommendations to pay more than the minimum amount. While the presence of the minimum payment requirement is unlikely to change, we propose that marketers and policymakers can influence the effects of minimum payments on dispersion by altering the way that information is displayed to consumers. Specifically, we investigate five distinct information displays and find that choice of display can either exaggerate or minimize dispersion and corresponding costs. We discuss implications for consumers, policy makers, and firms, with a particular focus on ways to improve consumer financial well-being.

Ownership, Learning, and Beliefs
(with Samuel M. Hartzmark and Alex Imas)
Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 2021

Abstract: We study how ownership affects learning and beliefs. Using an experimental asset market, we find that owning a good leads people to over-extrapolate from signals about its underlying value: after seeing positive signals, people become too optimistic, after seeing negative signals, they become too pessimistic. This result holds relative to a Bayesian benchmark and compared to learning about goods they do not own. In fact, learning is less biased and more "correct" about goods that are not owned. We replicate these results in field data, showing that asset owners over-extrapolate nearly twice as much as non-owners from the same signals.

Mental Budgeting vs. Relative Thinking
(with Devin G. Pope and Jihong Song)
AEA Papers and Proceedings, May, 2018

Abstract: A growing literature uses economic behaviors in field settings to test predictions generated by various psychological models. In some cases, psychological theories make conflicting predictions for the same consumer context. In this paper, we attempt to reconcile two conflicting predictions about upgrading behavior, one made by category budgeting (e.g.,Heath and Soll, 1996, Thaler, 1985)—which suggests people will upgrade less as prices go up—and one made by relative thinking (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1981)—which suggests people will upgrade more as prices go up.


Working Papers:

Does Increasing the Riskiness of Choices Widen Gender Gaps?
(with Alexander Willén ) Major Revision requested at Management Science
Abstract: We isolate the causal effect of changing the riskiness of choices on the gender gap in consequential real world decisions. We do so by exploiting a national reform to the regrade system of Norwegian universities which generated exogenous variation in the probabilities of the outcome of regrade requests. Using unique individual-level administrative data, we show that both the expected value of a regrade request, as well as the downside risk, increased substantially as a result of the policy. We then show how the ostensibly gender-neutral policy substantially increased gaps between men and women because they differed in their risk preferences and beliefs. Specifically, the exogenous shift in the riskiness of requesting a regrade augmented the regrade request gap by 90 percent. We demonstrate that the increased gender gap in regrade requests has consequential implications for students through its impact on their grade points. In terms of mechanisms, we show that the increased gender gap was caused by the change in the likelihood of a negative regrade outcome, suggesting that gender differences in risk preferences or beliefs about negative outcomes drive the results. We disentangle the relative importance of these mechanisms through auxiliary reduced-form analyses, structural estimation, and a supplemental lab experiment. We find that beliefs rather than loss aversion drive our findings. The findings reveal how gender differences in preferences and beliefs manifest when men and women make real world decisions.

The Effect of Job Loss on Risky Decision-Making
(with Daniel O'Leary, Abigail B. Sussman, and Jennifer Trueblood)
Abstract: The unemployment rate in the United States reached 14.7%, 23.1 million people, in 2020. While negative effects of unemployment on health and well-being are well-understood, the influence of job loss on decision-making has received little attention. Across a large-scale survey (N = 37,854) and three controlled experiments (total N=2005), we find that job loss increases risky decision making. First, in survey data, we find that job-loss among survey respondents is associated with elevated levels of risky decision-making across financial and non-financial contexts. Further, participants who have lost their jobs more recently make riskier decisions. Next, we find that an incentive-compatible manipulation of job loss in a lab setting increases take-up of financial risks. Shifting participants into the domain of losses appears to underlie this pattern. These findings have implications for individuals and policymakers as the decision to engage in risky behaviors can have negative long-term physical, financial, and psychosocial consequences.

Would You Use a South-Pointing Compass? Consumers Underestimate the Informativeness of Systematic Errors and Disagreement
(with Jay Naborn, Hannah Perfecto, Quentin Andre, and Nick Reinholtz) Submitted
Abstract: Consumers often lean on other people’s opinions when deciding what to purchase, consume, or do. In eight studies, we document a novel bias in people’s use of advice: Consumers are reluctant to seek out and use information from sources that systematically disagree with them, even when these sources are objectively more informative than people who agree with them. We demonstrate this underappreciation of systematic disagreement in various contexts: in choices and ratings of potential advisors, in joint and separate evaluation, and with and without monetary incentives. We explore three candidate mechanisms for the effect: a preference for homophily in social interactions, a belief that disagreement is inherently less informative than agreement when matters of taste are involved, and a positive test strategy in learning (whereby people intuitively consider confirmatory information over disconfirmatory information). The fact that the bias persists in non-social contexts as well as when matters of taste are irrelevant suggests that the first two mechanisms are not central to the effect. In contrast, the effect is attenuated when the consumption decision is framed as a rejection, and when participants are given time to reconsider their choice, which suggests a positive test strategy as a more likely mechanism.

Works in Progress:

Tests of Rank-dependent Probability Weighting in Risky Choice
(with George Wu )
Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) modified Original Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) by permitting decision weights to be rank-dependent. While rank-dependent decision weights have some well-known theoretical advantages – notably eliminating violation of first-order stochastic dominance and allowing for generalization to probability distributions with a large number of outcomes – they also have strong and testable empirical implications, namely that the decision weights are larger outcomes with higher relative ranks. We test whether decision weights are indeed rank-dependent using a large sample of choices between gambles. The gambles were selected to allow semi-parametric estimation of decision weights. Our estimates show strong evidence for rank-dependent decision weights, with the decision weights for the highest valued outcome significantly larger than the decision weights for the middle outcome, holding the probability of that outcome constant. Our estimated decision weights are substantially closer to Cumulative Prospect Theory than Original Prospect Theory, though both exact models are rejected in the data. In a prediction exercise, Cumulative Prospect Theory predicted choice shares fit our data on 3 outcome gambles substantially better.

Reference Dependent Expectations of Inequality
(with Alexander W. Cappelen , Matthew Rabin, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden)